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The First Use of Poison Gas
at Ypres, 1915
A Translation from the
German Official History1
Introduced and edited by
Mark Osborne Humphries and John Maker
Translated by Wilhelm J. Kiesselbach
While English-speaking historians know in detail about almost every event on the BEF’s 
front, the same cannot be said of our knowledge 
of the German side of the Western Front. This 
is not surprising, as comparatively few English 
language books have been written about the 
German experience on the battlefields of the 
Great War. Recent English language scholarship 
by Holger Herwig, Annika Mombauer, and 
Robert Foley,2 to name but a few historians,3 
has enriched our understanding of the conflict. 
However, these works have tended to concentrate 
on political and diplomatic history, or in the 
case of Mombaurer and Foley, on high-ranking 
officers such as Helmuth von Moltke and 
Erich von Falkenhayn. This means that events 
at the tactical and operational level remain 
comparatively unexplored in English. This gap 
in the historiography has largely been shaped by 
the absence of primary source materials. 
 The major impediment to study of the 
German army was the destruction of the military 
archive at Potsdam during Allied air raids on 
14 February and 14 April 1945.4 These raids 
destroyed virtually all the war diaries, field 
dispatches, orders and memoranda that made 
up the primary records that historians use to 
reconstruct a battle.5 Although the destruction of 
the archive was not total,6 the materials that did 
survive – or that have resurfaced following the 
end of the Cold War7 – represent only a fraction 
of the documents that exist on Allied operations, 
for example, in London or Ottawa. While recent 
historians have used these limited archival 
resources with great effect, a large history of 
Germany’s Great War was actually published 
before the destruction of the majority of the 
archival record.
 On 1 October 1919, as the institutions of 
Wilhelmine Prussia–Germany were being swept 
away, a new organization headed up by Hermann 
Mertz von Quirnheim was created to oversee the 
German archival holdings: the Reichsarchiv.8 
Military history in Germany had always been 
the purview of the Great General Staff, but with 
the abolition of that Prussian institution, the 
task of writing a comprehensive military history 
of the Great War was assigned to a special 
subsection of this new organization under the 
direction of Hans von Haeften.9 Although the 
Reichsarchiv and its Historical Section were 
officially civilian institutions, they were staffed 
by former members of the Great General Staff 
including Hans von Seeckt, Wilhelm Groener, 
and Hans von Haeften, and the military was thus 
able surreptitiously to maintain its control of 
military history in Germany.10 On 1 November 
1931, von Haeften became the president of the 
This article is excerpted from the forthcoming publication 
Germany’s Western Front: Translations from the German 
Official History of the Great War, edited by Mark Osborne 
Humphries and John Maker, a four-volume series in seven 
parts due to be published beginning in 2008. 
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Reichsarchiv and Wolfgang Foerster assumed the 
directorship of the Historical Section.11 Between 
1919 and 1 April 1934, when the Historical 
Section was removed from the umbrella of the 
Reichsarchiv and placed under the purview of 
the Reichswehrministerium (Military Ministry), 
the organization produced the first nine volumes 
of the main series12 and several ancillary texts. 
On 1 April 1937, the Historical Section became 
the Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des 
Heeres (KGFH) and was reintegrated into the 
German General Staff system until the project 
was completed in 1944.13 On 1 April 1936, 
the military records of the Reichsarchiv were 
also transferred to a new ‘Heeresarchiv’ (Army 
Archive) at Potsdam, which was administered 
by the KGFH, and it was here that they were 
destroyed at the end of the Second World War.14 
By 1945, however, the series had been completed 
and totalled over 9,300 pages accompanied by 
more than 430 maps and sketches.15
 Der Weltkreig, 1914 bis 1918  is a 
comprehensive, narrative overview of the Great 
War, based on a documentary record that no 
longer exists. Moreover, it contains lengthy 
excerpts (sometimes three or four pages) from the 
destroyed official documents. Published between 
1925 and 1944, the volumes of Der Weltkrieg 
are remarkable, not only because they are one of 
the only surviving sources of information on the 
day-to-day operations of the German Army as a 
whole, but also because they provide insight into 
how the Great War was understood and portrayed 
by an official, government organization during 
both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.16 
At times the history is apologetic, as when it 
explains the reasoning behind the first large-scale 
gas attack of the war, but is also remarkably frank 
as when it discusses German war aims on the 
Eastern Front. In fact, it is comparable in many 
ways to Edmonds’ British Official History, which 
has likewise had its critics.
 By their very nature, official histories of 
any kind are notoriously problematic. Like any 
work they are the product of a particular time 
and place in history. Unlike most historians, 
however, an “official” historian must satisfy 
both the demands of the sponsor organization 
as well as its members, if only for the simple 
reason that the co-operation of both parties is 
required to complete the work.17 The official 
historian also has the added burden of being 
part of the organization about which they are 
writing which can place the interests of historical 
objectivity in competition with loyalty, friendships 
and patriotism.18 Like the Canadian, British 
and Australian official historians, Reichsarchiv 
historians had to walk a difficult line between 
pleasing many of the officers with whom they 
had served in the Great War, while at the same 
time creating a work that was acceptable to both 
contemporary historians and the governments 
which funded the project.19
 Contemporary English-speaking historians 
were generally receptive to Der Weltkreig. In a 
1931 review of all the official histories published 
to date, Alexander Johnson wrote of Der 
Weltkrieg:
The military historians, who remain anonymous, 
deserve great credit for their splendid work. 
They present their story in simple, readable 
language that will sustain the interest of the 
lay reader and with a degree of fact-finding 
objectivity which commends itself to the military 
reader and student.20 
More recently, some historians have looked far 
less favorably on the German Official History, 
citing alleged Nazi influence, the German 
Fraktur typeface or an archaic use of language 
as reasons for ignoring the 14-volume series.21 
Hew Strachan, however, points out that Der 
Weltkrieg is an invaluable resource, when read 
in its proper context:
…the availability, since the end of the Cold War, 
of the working papers of the Reichsarchiv…has 
done much to confirm the value of its published 
work. The reluctance to use inter-war German 
histories on the grounds that they are tainted 
by Nazism is not only chronological nonsense in 
some cases (much was in print before 1933) but 
also an absurd self-denying ordinance, given the 
destruction of the bulk of the German military 
archives in 1945. The Reichsarchiv historians 
saw material we can never see; not to refer 
to their output is a cloak for little more than 
laziness or monolingualism.22
 To address this gap in the historigraphy, 
a project is currently underway to publish an 
English-language translation of the German 
Official History. This four-volume series in seven 
parts, tentatively titled Germany’s Western Front: 
Translations from the German Official History 
of the Great War, edited by the authors of this 
introduction, will aim to provide as complete a 
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picture as possible of the German experience 
on the Western Front with a special focus on the 
operations in which Canadians participated. 
The first volume, to be published in 2008,23 
will cover the year 1915 when Canadians first 
arrived on the Western Front. The series will 
focus on the battlefield events of the divisions and 
corps, but will also relate events at the highest 
strategic and political levels. Supplementary 
chapters, translated from other publications of 
the Reichsarchiv, will enrich our understanding 
of the tactical level battles in which Canadians 
participated. While the purpose of the series is 
to further our understanding of Canada’s Great 
War with a “view from the other side,” the series 
will also help to place the Canadian experience 
within a larger context by examining the events 
all along the Western Front that directly and 
indirectly affected the British Expeditionary 
Force, of which the Canadians were but a small 
part. This project has been made possible by 
funding from the Laurier Centre for Military 
Strategic and Disarmament Studies at Wilfrid 
Laurier University; a German-Canadian Studies 
Research Grant from the Spletzer Family 
Foundation (administered through the German-
Canadian Studies Foundation at the University 
of Winnipeg); and additional support from Dr. 
Jonathan Vance at the University of Western 
Ontario.
 What follows is a sample of the type of 
material found in Der Weltkrieg. It is an 
examination of the Second Battle of Ypres, first 
published in 1931. Interesting for its discussion 
of the reasons why the Germans used gas and 
the aims and objectives of the attack, it helps to 
contextualize our understanding of this important 
battle. Viewed from the Allied perspective, the 
German attack was a tactical failure because it 
did not eliminate the Ypres salient, a point also 
acknowledged in the conclusion of the German 
account. However, the Germans viewed the battle 
as a strategic success as it served to convince 
Britain and France that Germany did have an 
offensive capability on the Western Front.
 Since the failure of the Schlieffen Plan at 
the Marne in the fall of 1914, the German High 
Command had fought internal battles over the 
direction that the war should take. Falkenhayn 
believed that the war could only be won if France 
and Britain were defeated before attention was 
shifted to Russia. However, the leaders of the 
German army in the East – Hindenburg and 
Luddendorff – disagreed and argued that all 
available forces should be concentrated against 
Russia. After much intrigue and debate, which 
will be detailed further in the first volume 
of translations, Falkenhayn gave into their 
demands and the Western Front was stripped 
of all but those troops required for its defence. 
Not surprisingly, Falkenhayn was worried that 
the Allies would discover the size of the shift in 
the German forces and use it to their advantage. 
Despite fighting the French to a standstill in the 
Champagne in the first months of the year, the 
German army still needed to convince the Allies 
that its Western Front could not be breached 
so that its full attention could be directed to 
the Eastern Front. Gas, although unreliable, 
provided the German army in the West with the 
opportunity to punch above its weight. The fact 
that reserves could barely be scraped together for 
the attack demonstrated that the German army 
was overstretched, but the mere fact that it was 
able to launch an offensive that came so close to 
breaking the Allied line hid its vulnerability from 
the Allies. What the final outcome of the battle 
ultimately meant is up to the reader to decide, 
but this piece reminds us that history must be 
evaluated from both sides and that one person’s 
“fact” is another person’s interpretation.
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The German Supreme Army 
Command and the Forces on the 
Western Front in April 1915
During the early months of 1915, the German forces on the Western Front were involved 
in heavy defensive engagements culminating in 
the winter battle in the Champagne. Despite 
the commitment of their strongest forces and 
the bitter month-long fighting, the French did 
not manage to break through the front lines of 
the German Third Army. The British attempt 
to overrun the German Sixth Army at Neuve 
Chapelle also failed with heavy casualties, as 
did a French encircling attack against St. Mihiel 
salient.24 So with the troops encouraged by a sense 
of superiority, and a regained sense of confidence 
(despite their smaller numbers), in the middle 
of April the German Western Front stood firm. 
According to General von Falkenhayn,25 General 
Headquarters – Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) 
– the conviction began to take hold,
that for the foreseeable future the enemy in 
the West will not be able to force a decision 
even if newly-formed German forces on the 
Western Front would have to be committed to 
the Eastern Front in order to break Russian 
offensive power.26
This realization encouraged the OHL to decide on 
13 April to temporarily forego the implementation 
of the offensive plans on the Western Front in 
favor of temporarily shifting the war’s center of 
gravity to the Galician theatre of operations.27
* * * * *
Even though major German offensive actions in the West had to be discontinued, the OHL 
was not ready to give the enemy the upper hand 
by entirely limiting itself to defensive operations. 
Lively activity in the front lines combined with 
offensive raids “were intended to hide the troop 
transfers to Galicia.”
 Offensive operations were intended to 
be launched in Flanders as well as by Army 
Detachments Strantz and Gaede.28 Fourth Army 
was finally to execute the long-planned gas 
attack, the commencement of which especially 
interested the Chief of the General Staff so as to 
allow him to determine the effectiveness of this 
new weapon.29
The Gas Attack by
the Fourth Army at Ypres
Prior to the Great War, only the French planned to utilize gas as a weapon. In their army, a 
26 mm rifle grenade loaded with an ethyl bromo-
acetone filling, which had a suffocating effect, was 
Crops at Ypres: British soldiers at Ypres in the Spring of 1915. Note the
rudimentary nature of the trenches and the crops which are visible in the ﬁelds.
C
ou
rte
sy
 o
f w
w
w
.g
re
at
w
ar
di
ffe
re
nt
.c
om
Humphries and Maker - Ypres 1915.indd   60 08/08/2007   5:50:30 PM
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss3/7
61
introduced as a weapon for attacking fortified 
positions.30 At this time, however, Germany was 
not prepared for combat in which gas would be 
used as a weapon.
 At the beginning of the war, foreign newspapers 
repeatedly reported – incidentally without any 
reproach – the use of new and sinister French 
weapons, which were said to be fatal without any 
external symptoms. The French chemist Turpin 
was named as the inventor and in fact he did 
offer such a weapon to the French Ministry of 
War, but it was tried and found to be ineffective. 
In the Prussian Ministry of War, similar proposals 
submitted at the outbreak of the war were 
ignored.31
 Since the inception of static trench warfare 
in 1914, the proximity of the opposing trenches 
frequently impeded the firing of high explosive 
shells since one’s own soldiers were naturally 
put at risk by shrapnel. Beyond that, the tactical 
situation meant that the potential of the explosive 
could not effectively be brought to bear against 
a deeply dug-in and entrenched enemy. At this 
point the search for a more effective weapon 
began. In the beginning of 1915, the French 
leadership requested all available rifle gas 
grenades for the front lines. On 21 February the 
French Ministry of War issued a manual to the 
armed forces regarding the utilization of the rifle 
gas grenades and gas hand grenades, which had 
in the meanwhile been introduced.32 The order 
stated: “The fumes generated by these projectiles 
are not fatal, at least if they are not inhaled in 
excess.” Since the amount of the gas inhaled was 
hardly up to the individual soldier involved, the 
potential for a deadly effect was, without a doubt, 
clear. By the end of February, numerous reports 
from the Western Front regarding the deployment 
of these weapons against German soldiers were 
received.33
 The German leadership had to consider the 
possible deployment of chemical weapons by 
the enemy and was not willing to be taken by 
surprise. Initially the objective was merely to 
use gas to drive the enemy from the protection of 
their trenches into the effective range of artillery 
fire.34 By the end of 1914, the development of 
an artillery projectile (15 cm HE Shell 12T) had 
been completed. In addition to its considerable 
explosive capability, it also contained the gas 
ingredient xylyl bromide which was similar in its 
effectiveness, albeit less lethal, than the French 
version. This so-called “T-Shell” was first used 
on the Russian front in the beginning of 1915, 
however, due to the intense cold, the results were 
unsatisfactory.35 A pre-requisite for a success was 
mass effectiveness. To achieve this with shells 
carrying gas was initially out of the question 
due to a lack of artillery pieces and suitable 
propellants. Therefore the alternative of releasing 
the gas where air currents were supposed to carry 
it towards enemy positions became the most 
viable option.
 The existing conventions of international law 
– The Hague Land Warfare Conventions of 29 
July 1899 and 18 October 1907 and the Hague 
Declaration of 29 July 1899 – did not anticipate 
a war waged with gas.36 The Hague declaration 
merely forbade the use of projectiles that had the 
exclusive purpose of broadcasting suffocating and 
poisonous gasses. Based on the declaration’s “all 
participation clause,” the question as to whether 
this declaration was still binding on all the 
parties conducting the war after Turkey, as a non-
signatory of the agreement, became a party to the 
war on 3 November 1914, remains debatable.37 
Even if one assumes that the declaration 
General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Field Army and head of the OHL.
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remained binding among the signatories, the 
utilization of projectiles like the German T-Shell, 
which combined fragmentation with gas, was 
in accordance with international law since the 
dissemination of the gasses was not the “exclusive 
objective” of the weapon. This is in contrast 
with the French rifle grenade that had the single 
objective of spreading poison gas. Therefore the 
French rifle gas grenades represented the first 
violation of the international laws governing the 
waging of war with gas. The method of dispersing 
gas into the air [without the use of a projectile] 
was an invention of the German war industry and 
did not contravene any existing conventions of 
international law. Neither did the introduction of 
a gas weapon violate the laws of humanity since 
the percentage of casualties caused by shell fire 
was, and remained, considerably higher than by 
the use of gas in combat operations. Soldiers 
affected by exposure to gas were almost 
always totally rehabilitated without any 
physically debilitating after-effects.38
 Initially, chlorine gas was chosen 
to be used for combat because its 
production in sufficient amounts was 
possible without impeding the munitions 
industry in the homeland. The dispersion 
of liquid chlorine from numerous steel 
cylinders in the front trenches promised 
to create a chlorine gas cloud which 
would inundate the enemy positions 
in a sufficient density, even despite 
the loss of some of the gas to the air. 
Additionally chlorine gas had the right 
properties because it did not leave any 
appreciable residue, thus enabling our 
own forces to mount immediate attacks. 
Chlorine also had less of an effect on the 
human body than ethyl bromo-acetone 
and chloracetone, the gases used by the 
French. The creation of gas protection 
equipment was developed parallel to the 
production of this offensive weapon and 
during 1915 a gas mask was successfully 
developed for the German forces that 
protected their faces and respiratory 
systems.
 In January 1915, the tests had progressed 
to the point that General von Falkenhayn 
decided to provide the Fourth Army with 6,000 
large chlorine gas cylinders that were ready for 
deployment. Another 24,000 smaller versions 
were in the manufacturing pipeline. The OHL 
ordered Fourth Army to deploy the new weapon 
during an operation in the Ypres salient. It was 
calculated that an average of one large or two 
small cylinders were required per metre of front. 
The technical supervision was in the hands of the 
privy councillor, Professor Haber,39 who had been 
entrusted with the management of the newly-
formed chemical department of the Prussian 
Ministry of War and the execution was assigned 
to newly-formed pioneer units with especially 
assigned meteorologists under the command 
of Colonel Peterson.40 Considerable difficulties, 
Diagram of the installation of
German gas cylinders at Ypres.
Source: Rudolf Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg 
(Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1927), translated 
diagrams courtesy of the US Army War College, 
Carlisle, PA.
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however, remained to be resolved as commanding 
officers as well as rank and file soldiers regarded 
the untested weapon with distrust, if not with 
complete disapproval. Even the OHL viewed the 
gas weapon less than enthusiastically and refused 
to deploy it during the impending breakout-
offensive in the Galician theater of operations 
because it did not want to be dependent on the 
timing of this apparently quite unreliable weapon. 
The operation in the Ypres salient was therefore 
intended to test its combat effectiveness.
 On the morning of 21 April, General von 
Falkenheyn held a conference in Thielt with the 
commanding officer of the Fourth Army, General 
Albrecht Duke von Württemberg.41 At this meeting 
he insisted on an early execution of the gas attack 
in which the Fourth Army “should not aim for too 
distant an objective, but rather execute the attack 
at the first favorable opportunity.” Based on the 
positive weather forecast, the operation was 
ordered to begin at 0645 hours on the morning 
of 22 April 1915.42
 Fourth Army tasked the XXIII and XXVI 
Reserve Corps with the execution of the attack. 
The available gas cylinders had been installed in 
their positions north of Ypres from Steenstraate 
to Poelcappelle. Except for units of the 43rd 
Reserve Division, no larger forces were available 
for exploiting a potential advantage.43 The XXIII 
Reserve Corps was assigned the difficult objective 
of fighting its way across the Yser Canal. The 
primary objectives were as follows: for the 
XXIII Reserve Corps a line from northwest 
of Steenstraate through Lizerne to southwest 
of Pilkem; for the XXVI Reserve Corps the 
high ground along the Boesinghe–Pilkem–
Langemarck–Poelcappelle road. A further 
objective of the attack was “the capture of the 
Yser Canal, including Ypres.”44
 Due to a lack of favorable winds on the 
morning of 22 April, the attack had to be 
postponed until the late afternoon. This caused 
a severe problem since all preparations were 
made for an attack at dawn. The commanding 
general of the XXIII Reserve Corps, Lieutenant-
General von Kathen45 immediately expressed 
his concern about mounting an attack in full 
daylight, while the commanding general of the 
XXVI Reserve Corps, Lieutenant-General Baron 
von Hügel46 emphasized that the success of his 
Corps could only be expected if his flank was 
protected by a simultaneous attack by the XXIII 
Reserve Corps. Fourth Army’s Chief of Staff, 
Brigadier Ilse, attempted to allay these concerns 
by telephone but issued the following unequivocal 
orders: “the commander-in-chief categorically 
expects the XXIII Reserve Corps to advance with 
XXVI Reserve Corps to reach Hill 20 near Pilkem 
without fail.”
 At 1800 hours, the gas cylinders installed 
opposite the French 87th Territorial and 45th 
Infantry Divisions were opened. The Belgian 
General Staff had warned the French High 
Command about the possibility of a German gas 
attack a few days previously but apparently the 
warning was disregarded. The wind blew from 
the north at approximately two metres per second 
and a solid white-yellow wall rolled towards the 
enemy trenches. Even before it reached them, in 
some areas the enemy was observed retreating 
after firing a few rounds. Simultaneously, the 
German trenches were hit with spirited enemy 
artillery fire. At 1815 hours, immediately 
following the gas cloud, the German infantry 
began its attack.
General der Infanterie Baron von Hügel,
commanding general of XXVI Reserve Corps. 
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 In the area of the XXIII Reserve Corps, in 
front of Steenstraate, the release of the gas was 
not entirely successful. As a result, the left wing 
of the 45th Reserve Division commanded by 
Major-General (Generalleutnant) Schöpflin was 
only able to advance slowly under strong enemy 
defensive fire. It was very late in the day when 
the village of Steenstraate was taken with heavy 
casualties by units of the 45th and 46th Reserve 
Divisions. A continuation of the attack in the 
direction of Lizerne was beyond the capabilities 
of the already exhausted units. The main body of 
the 46th Reserve Division, commanded by Major-
General Hahn quickly advanced to the canal 
near and north of Het Sas, traversed it and took 
the western bank, while across from Boesinghe, 
they were only able to reach the canal in a few 
places.
 In front of the right wing of the XXVI Reserve 
Corps, the psychological impact was massive. 
The assault units of the 52nd Reserve Division 
commanded by Major-General Waldorf proceeded 
without resistance and reached their objective, 
the hills near Pilkem, at 1840 hours. There they 
were halted since the neighbouring divisions 
had fallen behind. The advance of the 51st 
Reserve Division to the east was considerably 
more difficult. The gas in front of their lines 
near and east of Langemarck was either not 
effective or the units did not attack immediately. 
Therefore the extreme right wing of the French 
and the Canadians adjacent to the east were 
able to offer a stubborn resistance and it was 
not until 1900 hours that Langemarck – which 
had been the scene of heavy and bloody fighting 
in earlier battles – was in German hands. The 
commanding officer of the 51st Reserve Division, 
Brigadier (Generalmajor) Friedrich von Kleist, 
then received orders to take the bridges across 
the Haanebeek Creek south of Langemarck as 
well as St. Julien on the same day if possible.
 The 37th Landwehr Brigade, which was in 
immediate reserve, was made available by the 
order of corps headquarters to the successful 
52nd Reserve Division and was brought forward 
to Pilkem. Around 1945 hours this division 
reported its attack on the heights south of Pilkem. 
In front of its advance, the artillery and reserves 
of the enemy were apparently swept back in a 
panicky retreat. In contrast to this, the enemy 
had moved reinforcements to St. Julien against 
the 51st Reserve Division thus impeding its 
advance. Aerial reconnaissance revealed train 
movements on the tracks between Hazebrouck 
and Poperinghe which led to the assumption that 
the enemy was moving additional reinforcements 
into the zone of operations. Consequently, the 
102nd Reserve Infantry Brigade, which had 
been held back in the Houthulster Forest, was 
moved up to Koekuit at this late hour. Around 
2130 hours, the 51st Reserve Division reported 
taking both bridges across Haanebeek Creek 
southwest of Langemarck while there was still 
fighting for the other bridge to the south. Both 
Divisions were ordered to hold their positions 
and to continue the attack on the next day with 
the 37th Landwehr Brigade ordered to establish 
a supporting position on the heights near Pilkem. 
The commander of the heavy artillery was 
instructed to advance and reposition his batteries 
during the night to be in a position to bring the 
enemy on the west side of the canal and in city 
of Ypres into range of the artillery.
 In summary, on 22 April the XXIII Reserve 
Corps had thrown the enemy across the canal 
between Steenstraate and Het Sas and the XXVI 
Reserve Corps had penetrated to a line from 
south of Pilkem to northwest of St. Julien. 
The captured enemy forces amounted to 1,800 
unwounded French and 10 British47 soldiers and 
captured materiel consisted of 51 artillery pieces 
– including four heavy guns – and approximately 
70 machine guns. 
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 By the evening of 22 April, the enemy had 
suffered a wide breach between the canal 
and St. Julien. Only weak French forces 
remained southeast of Boesinghe and, mixed 
with Canadians, north of Keerselaere. The breach 
was only barely secured by British forces and 
a cohesive line no longer existed. Movements 
of reinforcements and supplies were severely 
hampered by heavy German artillery fire aimed 
at the canal crossings near Ypres. Consequently, 
the position of the enemy in the Ypres salient had 
become seriously threatened.
 Encouraged by the successes of the first day 
of combat, Fourth Army’s commander believed he 
was justified in expanding the original objectives 
which had only extended to the Yser Canal and 
therefore issued orders on the morning of 23 
April to continue the attack in the “direction of 
Poperinghe.” The XXIII Reserve Corps was given 
a line from Pypegaele–Gegend to southwest of 
Boesinghe as its next objective. The XXVI Reserve 
Corps was ordered to continue the advance in a 
southerly direction, with its right wing along the 
canal, in order to attack the enemy positioned 
in front of the XXVII Reserve Corps from the 
rear. To accomplish this mission the Army 
Reserve (elements of the 43rd Reserve Division) 
commanded by Brigadier von Runckel was 
assigned to the XXIII Reserve Corps. The 86th 
Reserve Brigade was immediately engaged and 
replaced a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division, 
freeing that division for other combat missions. 
Additionally two regiments of the Marine Corps 
were moved into the area of Staden–Houthulst.
 During the night of 22-23 April, the left wing 
of the 45th Reserve Division, in the sector of the 
XXIII Reserve Corps was repeatedly attacked in 
Lizerne. Although the German forces were able to 
repel these attacks, as a result they were unable 
to launch their assigned combat missions with 
any sustainable energy. Consequently the 45th 
Reserve Division was only able to reach the sector 
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of the Yperlée Creek west of Steenstraate on 
23 April. The enemy had established defensive 
positions in front of the 46th Reserve Division 
along the Lizerne–Boesinghe road by adding 
reinforcements. Therefore the attack of this 
division met with limited success as well. 
 Initially on 23 April, the forces of the XXVI 
Reserve Corps had only to deal with British 
counterattacks. In order to support the advance 
of the 51st Reserve Division as early as 0845 
hours, General Baron von Hügel ordered the 
commander of the gas units to install all available 
gas cylinders in the sector of this division. 
From the order to attack issued at noon, the 
Commanding General of the XXVI Reserve Corps 
assumed that Army Headquarters:
considered the operation against Poperinghe 
to be the main undertaking and the advance 
of the XXVI Reserve Corps to be of secondary 
importance. Since sufficient forces for advancing 
on Poperinghe across the canal were not available, 
the success of this venture was in question from 
the outset. The advance of the army corps on the 
right wing along the channel was also impossible, 
as long as the neighbouring corps had not taken 
Boesinghe and would be further advancing on 
Poperinghe. This was thought to be the only way 
to remove the strong enemy artillery unit on the 
opposite side of the canal.
 According to reports received by the 
XXVI Reserve Corps, the enemy had dug in 
approximately 500 metres in front of the German 
lines; reinforcements had also been brought in 
from Ypres. Around 1830 hours, English and 
French forces initiated a counterattack along 
both sides of the Ypres–Pilkem road with French 
forces striking across the bridges near Boesinghe. 
Although the enemy attack was repulsed, the 
forward movement of the XXVI Reserve Corps 
had been stopped. On 24 April, the 52nd Reserve 
Division was ordered to hold in the positions they 
had gained. Following a gas attack early on 24 
April, the 51st Reserve Division with the 102nd 
Reserve Infantry Brigade, was ordered to take 
the ridge north of Wieltje and Frezenberg. 
 In the meantime48 the OHL intervened 
and informed Fourth Army Headquarters 
“that Poperinghe was not even considered an 
operational objective at this time, rather that at 
the present the closing of the Ypres salient could 
be the only concern.”49
Above left: German soldiers with rudimentary gas mask; Top right: Supply dump behind the front lines of Reserve 
Infantry Regiment (RIR) 234; Bottom right: The front line trenches of RIR 234 at Ypres.
S
ou
rc
e:
 L
ut
z 
K
ni
el
in
g 
un
d 
A
rn
ol
d 
B
ol
sc
he
, A
us
 D
eu
ts
ch
la
nd
s 
gr
os
se
r Z
ei
t: 
H
el
de
nt
at
en
 
de
ut
sc
he
r R
eg
im
en
te
r, 
B
an
d 
31
: R
es
er
ve
 In
fa
nt
ry
 R
eg
im
en
t 2
34
 (Z
eu
le
nr
od
a-
Th
ür
: 
B
er
nh
ar
d 
S
po
rn
, B
uc
hd
ru
ck
er
ei
 u
nd
 V
er
la
gs
an
st
al
t, 
19
3?
).
Humphries and Maker - Ypres 1915.indd   66 08/08/2007   5:50:35 PM
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss3/7
67
 On the morning of 24 April elements of the 
45th and 46th Reserve Divisions stormed the 
strongly-contested village of Lizerne. After heavy 
fighting with heavy losses that lasted late into the 
night, the left wing of the 46th Reserve Division 
managed to take the eastern bank of the canal 
opposite Boesinghe.
 At 0500 hours gas was released north of St. 
Julien in the sector of the XXVI Reserve Corps 
and the 101st and 102nd Reserve Infantry 
Brigades immediately attacked behind the thinly 
developing cloud. After heavy fighting their attack 
slowly advanced during the morning, at first west 
of Keerselaere and later to the east of it as well. 
The fate of this village, that was defended by the 
enemy with tenacious determination, was not 
decided until mid-day. South of Keersslaere, in 
the farms and hedgerows of St. Julien, the enemy 
continued to resist. In the afternoon, Fourth 
Army Headquarters assigned both regiments 
of the Naval Corps to the XXVI Reserve Corps 
and as a result General Baron von Hügel again 
ordered a penetration west of St. Julien at 1445 
hours. The regiments of the 51st Reserve Division 
did not reach St. Julien until 1900 hours after 
heavy fighting and had to again vacate the village 
soon afterwards as a result of attacking British 
battalions. In the sector of the neighbouring 
52nd Reserve Division, the day generally passed 
quietly. For 25 April, General Baron von Hügel 
planned the continuation of the ordered attack. 
The deployment was planned for 0515 hours. 
This time Colonel Peterson had been ordered 
to install gas cylinders in the sector of the 52nd 
Reserve Division east from the Ypres–Pilkem 
Road to the woods west of St. Julien. 
 On 24 April, the XXVI Reserve Corps and the 
right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps stepped 
into the attack. The following plan was agreed 
upon: at the beginning of the day a combined 
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brigade50 of the 53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division 
commanded by Brigadier von Schmieden 
deployed behind the left wing of the 51st Reserve 
Division was to join the attack, execute a turn and 
roll the enemy up from the northwest in front of 
the 38th Landwehr and 106th Reserve Infantry 
Brigades. During the execution of this attack, 
advancing from Poelcappelle, Brigade Schmieden 
faced a fresh enemy and therefore had to mount 
a frontal attack. It was not until this obstacle had 
been removed that the turn to the southeast could 
be executed. On the evening of 24 April, the right 
wing of the brigade had fought to a standstill on 
the hills northwest of Gravenstafel. 
 West of the canal, the artillery bombardment 
against the forces of the XXIII Reserve Corps 
had, on 25 April, increased to the point where a 
successful continuation of the attack was out of 
the question.
 Early on 25 April the XXVI Reserve Corps 
regained possession of St. Julien which had 
been vacated by the enemy. The 51st Reserve 
Division had orders to reach the objectives 
established on 24 April: the ridge north of Wieltje 
and Frezenberg. The neighbouring 52nd Reserve 
Division was to enter the battle in a supporting 
role. At 0700 hours, seven British battalions 
launched a surprise attack southwest of St. 
Julien against the German forces that had been 
deployed for the attack. The incredibly forceful 
enemy attack that came in waves could not be 
entirely repulsed until 0800 hours. With that, 
the combat capabilities of the German forces 
had deteriorated; only the regiments on the left 
wing of the 51st Reserve Division gained minimal 
ground east of St. Julien in tenacious fighting 
later on.
 On the right wing of the XXVII Reserve 
Corps, in the advancing darkness, the Fortuin-
Mosselmarkt road was reached and approximately 
1,000 Canadians were taken prisoner. However, 
with the aid of reinforcements south of the road, 
the enemy, who had previously been driven back, 
continued their resistance. 
 The intentions of the Commanding General 
of the Fourth Army became clear with the orders 
issued in the afternoon of 25 April following a 
conference with the Commanding General of 
the XXIII Reserve Corps. General von Kathen 
emphasized the necessity to continue the attack 
in order to take Boesinghe. The Fourth Army 
Commander opposed this plan arguing: 
The outcome of this attack is doubtful. It would 
take great sacrifices and it would be difficult to 
hold that much ground on the western bank. 
The Corps should be satisfied with its [present] 
accomplishment … The Fourth Army’s objective 
is primarily to close the salient east of Ypres 
with the attack by the XXVI Reserve Corps. 
Only then could an advance past Boesinghe be 
considered.
 On the afternoon of the 26th, a number of 
strong French attacks were directed against 
the area of Steestraate and Het Sas. They were 
conducted by territorial forces and elements of 
the recently activated 153rd Infantry Division 
supported by effective British and Belgian artillery 
support. The 46th Reserve Division thus found 
itself in a precarious situation and the enemy 
took the position west of Het Sas, although the 
locks on the canal could be held. In the meantime 
Lizerne was also attacked at 1800 hours from a 
northerly direction and was taken by the enemy. 
The Germans occupied the old French trench 
east of the town but due to heavy enemy fire, a 
planned counterattack did not materialize.
 Reports received by the XXVI Reserve Corps 
during the course of the morning revealed that 
the enemy had assembled two fresh Corps in 
the area east of Ypres and was clearly planning a 
counterattack which was initiated with aggressive 
artillery support. Shortly after noon strong enemy 
forces – part of the British 28th as well as the 
4th, and 50th Territorial and Lahore Divisions 
– attacked from the Canal to St. Julien but every 
attempt failed due to the unswerving stand of the 
German infantry.
 As at St. Julien, the enemy counterattacks on 
26 April in the area of Gravenstafel prevented a 
further advance by the XXVII Reserve Corps.
 During the following days, enemy attempts 
to push the badly-mauled regiments of the 46th 
Reserve Division (part of the XXIII Reserve Corps) 
back to the eastern bank of the canal failed as 
again the waves of the attack broke against the 
German lines. The division was able, however, 
to hold the new positions on the Yperlée Creek 
with the support of the 45th Reserve Division.
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 The XXVI Reserve Corps 
Headquarters abandoned the 
continuation of the attack since 
the number of installed gas 
cylinders was considered to be 
insufficient and, in view of the 
well entrenched enemy, and the 
weakness of the German artillery, 
an attack without the support of 
gas was considered to be almost 
hopeless. Therefore, a further 
advance by the strong right wing 
of the XXVII Reserve Corps with 
the objective of breaking through 
to Gravenstafel from the north 
was delayed.
 In the meantime the British 
Commander in Chief, Field 
Marshal Sir John French, began 
to doubt the advisability of holding 
the threatened Ypres salient. As 
early as 27 April, he had ordered 
the local commander to initiate 
preparations for a withdrawal 
to a rearward position in the 
area east of Ypres. In response 
to emphatic protestations by 
General Foch, and despite the 
development of the precarious 
military situation, the execution of 
this plan was postponed. A British 
signal intercepted on the evening 
of April 29 carried the following 
message: “The situation of our 
forces, British as well as French, 
in Ypres is critical. We must be 
prepared for bad news.” Fourth 
Army Headquarters saw this 
as a confirmation of its opinion 
that the enemy considered the 
salient east of Ypres to be more 
and more difficult to hold and, 
with a continuation of pressure, 
an evacuation in the near future 
could be expected.
 On 2 May, combat units designated by Fourth 
Army and supported by gas, renewed the attack 
north of Ypres.
 Shortly after 1800 hours both divisions of 
the XXVI Reserve Corps reported the opening 
of the gas cylinders installed between Pilkem 
and St. Julien. The effect on the enemy was 
lessened as the transmission of commands was 
badly hampered by destroyed telephone lines, 
which prevented a coordinated simultaneous 
release of the gas. The density of the gas was 
also diminished by gusting winds and the effect 
on an enemy equipped with simple protection 
devices was negligible and the attackers met 
insurmountable resistance.
The ruined village of Langemark (Top) and St. Julien (Middle) as photographed 
by soldiers of RIR 234; Bottom: Captured English (possibly Canadian) trenches 
at Ypres.
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 On 3 May, the 51st Division, which was 
to transfer the weight of the attack to the left 
wing, was reinforced by a marine infantry 
regiment. Aided by the terrain which featured 
numerous individual farms, the enemy resisted 
tenaciously. 
 On the right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, 
however, the 38th Landwehr Brigade managed on 
2 May to gain some ground on the Mosselmarkt–
Fortuin road. The 105th Reserve Infantry Brigade 
(Schmieden) adjoining in the east was stalled in 
front of a ferociously defended trench network in 
a forest north of Gravenstafel. Considering these 
small and unimportant gains, which had resulted 
in high casualties, the Commanding General, 
Lieutenant-General (General der Artillerie) von 
Schubert, proposed to Fourth Army that they 
abandon the costly preliminaries at Zonnebeke 
and put the available forces that would result – at 
least a division – in the vicinity of Keerselaere at 
the disposition of the General Officer commanding 
Fourth Army in order to support a decisive attack 
by XXVI Reserve Corps on Ypres. Fourth Army, 
however, did not accept this proposal. Therefore 
on 3 May, the 105th Reserve Infantry Brigade 
had to continue attacking the trench network 
occupied by the enemy. This attack, which was 
executed with determination, was crowned with 
total success.
 Under the pressure of these attacks, on the 
night of 3-4 May, the British forces evacuated 
their positions from Fortuin to southwest of 
Gheluvelt. XXVI Reserve Corps Headquarters 
immediately ordered the 51st Division to attack. 
Despite continuous fighting against stubborn 
resistance, only a line from Vanheule Farm to the 
Haanebeek Creek was reached. 
 The XXVII Reserve Corps and the XV Corps 
on the left in the southern part of the Ypres 
salient, however, did not initially meet any 
resistance. General von Schubert deployed the 
right wing of the 53rd Reserve Division in the 
direction of Frezenberg and the left wing of the 
54th (Württemberg) in the direction of Eksterneft. 
The XV Corps reported that the right wing of the 
39th Infantry Division was also in the process of 
advancing on Eksterneft. Around 1600 hours, 
the divisions were again facing strongly-fortified 
enemy positions in the area to the northeast of 
Wieltje and Frezenberg and to the east of Hooge, 
which necessitated a carefully planned attack; 
this was ordered on the afternoon of 6 May. 
 Motivated by the urgent desire to push the 
enemy across the Yser Canal as soon as possible, 
Fourth Army intended to continue the attack 
with an encircling movement from three sides. 
With this in mind, XXVI Reserve Corps was 
supposed to advance in a southerly direction in 
order to take the hills around Wieltje, XXVII was 
to attack the high ground facing it to the west 
and XV Corps was to push the enemy back in 
a northwesterly direction between Bellewaarde 
Lake and Zillebeke Lake. The commencement of 
the artillery barrage was set for 0800 hours on 8 
May.
 The main burden for the attacks was born 
by the XXVII Reserve Corps. At 1030 hours on 
8 May, after a three-hour artillery preparation, 
the regiments advanced under favorable weather 
conditions against the British 27th and 28th 
Infantry Divisions but found the forward trenches 
deserted. After coming under strong enemy 
artillery fire, the advance over open ground 
soon ground to a halt. As night fell, at least 
the commanding ridge west of Frezenberg and 
Eksterneft was in German hands. 
 Around 1440 hours on the next day, XXVIII 
Reserve Corps Headquarters received the 
following message from Fourth Army: 
His Royal Majesty informs that according to 
an intercepted British order to retreat,51 all 
indications are that the British have abandoned 
all resistance on the eastern bank of the Yser. At 
the present time the Sixth Army is under attack 
by strong British forces. All indications are that 
the British are assembling all available forces in 
front of the Sixth Army.
 As the result, General von Schubert ordered 
a new artillery preparation from 1530 hours 
to 1700 hours, which assisted the attacking 
forces in making small gains in terrain up to the 
Verlorenhoek–Bellewaarde Lake. The objective 
“to push the enemy into his final position near 
Potijze” was not accomplished despite the 
sacrificial valor of the attacking regiments.
 On 9 May, parts of the XXII Reserve Corps 
joined the battle along the coast, but in connection 
with the XXVI Reserve Corps and the right wing of 
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the XV Corps, were able only to make insignificant 
gains. Their attacks failed too because of the 
strong resistance in the enemy trenches
* * * * *
By 9 May, the fighting around Ypres was generally over. The entire attack up to then 
had cost the Germans more than 35,000 men 
while the British lost 59,275 men between 22 April 
and 31 May; according to their own calculations, 
the French losses were extremely high. On 22 
April alone they lost 18,000 soldiers.
 Despite the new gas weapon, the success of 
the action at Ypres did not extend past the initial 
gains and the objective of closing the Ypres salient 
was not accomplished. The primary reasons for 
this are that on 22 April the surprise of the enemy 
could not be sufficiently exploited due to the 
approaching darkness. Although in early May the 
enemy had retreated to the prepared positions 
between Wieltje and Little Zillebeke, in spite 
of pressure from heavy losses, they repeatedly 
attacked the forces of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve 
Corps. The initial successes north of Ypres were, 
however, mostly due to the employment of gas, 
which demonstrated to the command and rank 
and file its usefulness as a new weapon,52 despite 
its intrinsic shortcomings.
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Dear sir,
The analysis of death sentences a n d  c o m m u t a t i o n s 
i n  “A r b i t r a r y  J u s t i c e ? : 
A Comparative Analysis of 
Canadian Death Sentences 
Passed and Commuted during 
the First World War” by Teresa 
Iacobelli (Winter 2007) has been 
long overdue.
 T h o u g h  t h e  s a m p l e 
investigated was biased, because 
all instances were Canadian, it 
seems quite likely that a wider 
probe would reveal similar 
inconsistencies attributable 
to the timing of operations 
(planned or in process) and 
to concerns about the state of 
individual battalions.
 A fundamental question 
here is why, given the Australian 
experience, the British and 
Canadians persisted in their 
belief that the application of 
the death penalty improved 
the discipline of their troops 
and the performance of their 
battalions.
 Whatever his  mil i tary 
shortcomings might have been, 
no Australian soldier was 
executed during World War I. 
Yet the Australian divisions 
were consistently among the 
best-performing divisions on the 
Western Front.
J.F. Doig
Wolfville, NS
ps. Was the sketch accompanying 
the article correctly titled? It 
looks more like an interrogation 
by a “bad cop,” prior to turning 
the prisoner over to a “good 
cop” who will offer him a seat, a 
cigarette and a bit of sympathetic 
conversation. [Eds. note: the 
caption was the origin written 
by the artist.]
* * * * *
Dear Sir,
Ihave just started reading through Spring 2007 issue of 
CMH and as always I completely 
enjoy the magazine contents. 
While reading “Fighting Time: 
Gregg  Centre  and Roya l 
Canadian Engineers Join Forces 
to Record New Brunswick’s 
Past,” by Lee Windsor and Lee 
Ellen Pottie, I was a more than 
a bit shocked to find that the 
Royal Canadian Engineers are 
being credited with helping you 
clear the Red Head site. Guys, I 
hate to tell you this, but the RCE 
has not existed since 1968!
 A- JS -007-003/JD -001 
Customs and Traditions of the 
Canadian Military Engineers 
para 56, page 7-19 states:
In reaction to the public’s rising 
criticism of the peacetime defence 
budget, the Federal Liberal Party 
promised in the 1963 election a 
full review of Canadian defence 
policy. In 1964 the Bill C-90 
passed Parliament integrating 
the three services’ headquarters 
and other activities such as 
recruiting and basic training. 
The unification of the services 
into a single force was presented 
to Parliament in Bill C-243 in 
December 1966. On 2 February 
1968, the three traditional 
services of Canada’s fighting force 
passed into history to be replaced 
by a single unified service, “The 
Canadian Forces.” The Corps of 
Royal Canadian Engineers, the 
RCAF Construction Engineering 
Branch and the RCN Civil 
Engineering Branch also ceased 
to exist at that date. A review 
of the engineering tasks facing 
the Canadian Forces (CF) led 
to the merging of the combat 
engineer ing,  construct ion 
engineering, survey, and fire 
protection into oneorganization. 
It was named the Canadian 
Military Engineer (CME) Branch 
and officially designated as such 
on 1 April 1968.
 Such was the case with all of 
the army Corps who during the 
same period became Branches. I 
hope this information clears up 
an apparent confusion over the 
correct name of the Engineers 
and that credit will be given to 
the CME for helping you with 
your project. 
WO Storey, CD
Mapping and Charting 
Establishment
Canadian Military Engineers
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